Το όραμα-στρατηγική Μακρόν για την Ευρώπη

Με βάση την τελευταία συνέντευξη που έδωσε ο πρόεδρος της Γαλλίας Εμμανουέλ Μακρόν στο περιοδικό Le Grand Continent [1] μπορούμε να ανιχνεύσουμε μία στρατηγική αρθρωμένη σε 5 άξονες. Το άρθρο που ακολουθεί υπογράφεται από τον Γρηγόρη Κοτσίρη για λογαριασμό του GEOEUROPE.ORG

Πρώτον, ο οικονομικός άξονας
Ο ΕΜ θεωρεί ότι είναι απαραίτητη μία συναίνεση σε παγκόσμια κλίμακα, αν θέλουμε να επαναδομήσουμε την πολυμέρεια γύρω από νέες προτάσεις.

«And that is why I want to launch what we could call the “Paris consensus”, but which will be the consensus everywhere (…) which consists in going beyond these major dates which have structured the political fact. , intellectual of the last decades, to question the element of concretization of the so-called Washington consensus, and therefore the fact that our societies were also built on the paradigm of open economies, of a social market economy, as we said in post-war Europe, which moreover became less and less social, more and more open, and which, after this consensus, basically, entered a dogma where the truths were: reduction of share of the State, privatizations, structural reforms, opening of economies through trade, financialization of our economies, with a fairly monolithic logic based on the constitution of profits.»

Σε τι συνίσταται αυτό το πρόγραμμα της «Συναίνεσης του Παρισιού»; Για τον ΕΜ το πρώτο που χρειάζεται είναι ιδεολογική δουλειά που θα επιτρέψει στην Ευρώπη και στη Γαλλία να επαναξιολογήσουν τον τρόπο που σκέπτονται και το μέλλον τους.

«Europe has a lot of nonsense. On the geostrategic level, we had forgotten to think because we thought through NATO about our geopolitical relations, let’s be clear – France less than others by its history, but this superego is still present, I sometimes fight against this one.»

Το δεύτερο βήμα θα είναι η δημιουργία νέων συμμαχιών με την ενσωμάτωση μη κρατικών οντοτήτων. Το κλειδί για τη Συναίνεση του Παρισιού θα είναι ο επαναπροσδιορισμός της πορείας, σε παγκόσμιο επίπεδο, προς την προτεραιότητα της κλιματικής αλλαγής.

«My conviction, and I say this after making a lot of mistakes, including in our country with the carbon contribution, we cannot lead this transition if we do not invest massively and if we do not make a transition which is both ecological and social and if we do not transform the way of production and, basically, the heart of the model of our structures.»

Υπό αυτή την προοπτική, το εμπόριο θα είναι μία «δεύτερη μεταβλητή», με την προϋπόθεση ότι θα υπάρξει συμμόρφωση και συνέπεια σε πολιτικό επίπεδο.

«We therefore need to have trade agreements that are consistent with our climate agenda, which is a huge battle. And there, on that, there is not yet a European consensus (…) certain countries have remained with a software which is a software of opening and trade, which I respect. But the commercial variable remains second. I think that this is not consistent from an efficiency point of view, but above all that it is not politically sustainable.»

Η Συναίνεση του Παρισιού θα δώσει τη δυνατότητα να αμφισβητηθεί το πλαίσιο το οποίο κυριάρχησε από την δεκαετία του ’80 στη διαμόρφωση της οικονομικής πολιτικής, δηλαδή η Συναίνεση της Ουάσιγκτον.

«I believe very deeply that we are at a breaking point […] also very deep, in addition to these political meetings, which is a breaking point of contemporary capitalism. Because it is a capitalism which has become financialized, which has become over-concentrated and which no longer makes it possible to manage inequalities in our societies and at the international level. And we can only answer it by recasting it. First of all, we do not respond to it in a single country, I have adopted a policy that does not go in this direction at all and I accept it perfectly. As true as socialism did not work in one country, the struggle against this functioning of capitalism is ineffective in one country.»

Οι σοσιαλιστικές και ριζοσπαστικές πολιτικές δυνάμεις της Ευρώπης, ταυτίζουν τη Συναίνεση της Ουάσιγκτον με τον νεοφιλελευθερισμό, χωρίς να μπορούν να διατυπώσουν ένα πιο σύγχρονο δόγμα. Η πρόταση του ΕΜ φιλοδοξεί να καλύψει αυτό το κενό.

Ο ΕΜ εδραιώνει την κριτική του στη Συναίνεση της Ουάσιγκτον σε δύο σημεία. Το πρώτο είναι η αδυναμία στην αντιμετώπιση οικολογικών προβλημάτων.

«First, [the Washington consensus] does not allow thinking about and internalizing the great changes in the world, in particular climate change which remains an externality in the Washington consensus. However, we arrive at a point where the urgency is such that it is impossible to ask governments to manage one of the priority questions of the moment, the question undoubtedly priority for the generation to come, simply as an externality of market.»

Το δεύτερο αφορά την ανεξέλεγκτη αύξηση των κοινωνικών ανισοτήτων ως αποτέλεσμα του μετασχηματισμού των σύγχρονων οικονομιών από τη δεκαετία του ’80, η οποία έχει σφραγίσει τη μοίρα των μεσαίων τάξεων στις κοινωνίες της Δύσης.

«The second thing is inequalities. The functioning of the contemporary and financialized market economy has allowed innovation and an exit from poverty in some countries, but it has increased inequalities in our countries. Because it has relocated massively, because it has reduced a part of our population to a feeling of uselessness, with deep economic, social and also psychological tragedies: our middle classes in particular, and part of our working classes have been the adjustment variable of this globalization; and this is unsustainable. It is unbearable, and we have undoubtedly underestimated it.»

Σε πολιτικό επίπεδο, οι προτάσεις του ΕΜ για τη Συναίνεση του Παρισιού θα μπορούσαν να προωθήσουν ώσμωση στον χώρο των προοδευτικών δυνάμεων που θεωρούν ότι η πανδημία και η οικονομική κρίση που προκαλεί, μπορεί να αποτελέσει ευκαιρία για την αλλαγή του οικονομικού παραδείγματος σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο.

Δεύτερον, ο ιστορικός άξονας
Για τον ΕΜ η μεταπολεμική ιστορία της Ευρώπης και του Δυτικού κόσμου καθορίζεται από τρεις χρονολογίες-κλειδιά που συνδέονται με αλλαγές και στον χώρο των ιδεών. Η πρώτη περίοδος είναι το 1945, όταν δημιουργείται ένα πολυμερές πλαίσιο συνύπαρξης των εθνικών κρατών.

«We can see that we have a crisis of the multilateral framework of 1945: a crisis of its effectiveness, but, more serious in my eyes, basically, a crisis of the universality of the values … carried by its structures. And it is for me – it was mentioned earlier in the Paris Peace Forum conference – one of the most serious points of what we have just experienced in recent times. Elements like the dignity of the human person, which were intangible, and in which basically all the peoples of the United Nations, all the countries represented, were inscribed, are now called into question, put into perspective. There is a contemporary relativism coming, which is really a rupture, and which is the play of powers which are not comfortable with the framework of the human rights of the United Nations. There is very clearly a Chinese game, a Russian game on this subject.»

Η δεύτερη περίοδος αφορά το 1968 και τις αλλαγές που έφερε στις Δυτικές κοινωνίες σε επίπεδο αξιών και που σήμερα αμφισβητείται από τις συντηρητικές δυνάμεις.

«You see a neo-conservatism rising, everywhere in Europe moreover, which is a questioning – it is the neo-conservatives themselves who take it as a reference – of 1968, that is to say basically of a state of maturity of our democracy – the recognition of minorities, this movement for the liberation of peoples and societies – and there is the return of the majority fact and in a way of a form of peoples’ truth.»

Τέλος υπάρχει το 1989 που σηματοδοτεί την κατάρρευση του Υπαρκτού Σοσιαλισμού και την επικράτηση ιδεολογιών για «το τέλος της ιστορίας», οι οποίες ανατρέπονται με την άνοδο του αυταρχισμού σε πολλές χώρες ανά την υφήλιο.

«The generations which were born after 1989 did not know the last great struggle which structured Western intellectual life and our relations: anti-totalitarianism. They were structured for many, as well as their access to academic and political life, on a fiction which was the “end of history” and an implicit which was the permanent extension of democracies, individual freedoms, etc. We see that this is no longer the case. Reemerge regional powers that are authoritarian, reemerge theocracies.»

Με τα δεδομένα αυτά, έχει ιδιαίτερη σημασία για τον ΕΜ, η Ευρώπη να διατυπώσει και να υπερασπιστεί τις δικές της αξίες, παρά το ότι όλες οι χώρες της ΕΕ δεν ασπάζονται το ίδιο αξιακό σύστημα.

«Because I think that we are a coherent geographical space in terms of values, in terms of interests, and that it is good to defend it in oneself. We are an aggregation of different peoples and different cultures. There is no such concentration of so many languages, cultures and diversity in a given geographic space. But something unites us. Moreover, we know that we are European when we are sent out of Europe.»

Για τον ΕΜ η παγκοσμιότητα των ιδεών που προκύπτουν από την ιστορία της Ευρώπης και πάνω στις οποίες στηρίζεται το ευρωπαϊκό οικοδόμημα, βρίσκεται σε κρίση. Δεν πρόκειται για μία κρίση θεσμών του μεταπολεμικού κόσμου, αλλά για μια κρίση πολιτισμού. Ο ΕΜ θεωρεί ότι θα πρέπει να ενστερνιστούμε πάλι αυτές τις ιδέες ενάντια στον ριζοσπαστικό ισλαμισμό. Αλλά θα πρέπει να γίνει σαφές ότι, ο εχθρός δεν είναι ένας άλλος πολιτισμός, αλλά ο σκοταδισμός.

«The fight we are waging against terrorism and radical Islamism is a European fight, it is a fight for values, […] against barbarism and obscurantism. […] It is not at all a shock of civilization, I do not recognize myself at all in this reading of things, because it is not a Christian Europe which would go against the Moslem world, fantasy in which some want train us. It is a Europe which has Judeo-Christian roots, it is a fact, but which knew how to construct two things: the coexistence of religions between them and the secularization of the political fact. These are two achievements of Europe. Because this is what made it possible to recognize the primacy of the rational and free individual and therefore respect between religions.»

Τρίτον, ο γεωπολιτικός άξονας
Για τον ΕΜ ο γεωπολιτικός άξονας αρθρώνεται γύρω από τρεις συνιστώσες. Η πρώτη αφορά τη γεωπολιτική Ευρώπη, η δεύτερη αφορά τη στρατηγική αυτονομία της Ευρώπης και η τρίτη αφορά τη σχέση της Ευρώπης με την Αφρική.
Η γεωπολιτική Ευρώπη

Με την τρέχουσα κρίση του παγκόσμιου πολυπολικού συστήματος, για τον ΕΜ η μόνη λύση είναι η ενδυνάμωση της πολιτικής Ευρώπης.

«Besides that, the course, for me, is also the importance, at this moment – and one for me is complementary to the other – to strengthen and structure a political Europe. Why? Because if we want cooperation to be created, balanced poles must be able to structure this cooperation, around a new multilateralism, that is to say a dialogue between the different powers to decide together. This implies to state that the frameworks of multilateral cooperation are weakened today, because they are blocked: I am obliged to note that the Security Council of the United Nations no longer produces useful solutions today.»

Για να επιτευχθεί μία τέτοια εξέλιξη είναι αναγκαία μία επανάσταση για την υπέρβαση των τρόπων σκέψης που βασίζονται σε εθνικά πρότυπα και στη μέχρι σήμερα ιστορία της Ευρώπης. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι θα πρέπει να ξεπεραστούν οι τυποποιημένες ιδέες για την Ευρώπη που δίνουν προτεραιότητα στην οικονομία, το εμπόριο και το πιστωτικό σύστημα.

«Europe is not just a market. Implicitly, for decades, we have acted as if Europe were a single market. But we did not think of Europe internally as a finite political space. […] Europe must rethink itself politically and act politically to define common objectives which are not simply a delegation of our future to the market.»

Οπωσδήποτε, είναι νωρίς να αναφερόμαστε σε «ευρωπαϊκή κυριαρχία», γιαυτό και ο ΕΜ προτιμάει τον όρο «στρατηγική αυτονομία»

«Can we go so far as to talk about European sovereignty, as I have done myself? It is a term which is a little excessive, I admit, because if there were European sovereignty, there would be a fully installed European political power. We’re not there yet. There is a European Parliament which nevertheless defends a European citizen representation, but I consider that these forms of representation are not completely satisfactory. This is also why I strongly defended the idea of transnational lists, that is to say the emergence of a real European demos that can be structured, not in each country and in each family policy within it, but in a more transversal way. […] But between what the Commission is doing.»

Ευρωπαϊκή στρατηγική αυτονομία
Σύμφωνα με τον ΕΜ, η Ευρώπη πρέπει να οικοδομήσει μία στρατηγική αυτονομία με όρους στρατιωτικούς, τεχνολογικούς και νομικούς. Σε ό,τι αφορά την άμυνα, η εκλογή του Τζο Μπάιντεν και η πιθανή επιστροφή σε ισχυρότερη διατλαντική συνεργασία δεν θα πρέπει να οδηγήσει την Ευρώπη να εγκαταλείψει το σχέδιο της στρατηγικής αυτονομίας.

«The United States will only respect us as allies if we are serious with ourselves, and if we are sovereign with our own defense. So I think that on the contrary, the change of American administration is an opportunity to continue in a totally peaceful, quiet way, which allies between them must understand: we need to continue to build our autonomy for ourselves, as the United States does it for them, as China does for them.»

Για το θέμα αυτό υπάρχουν δύο διαφορετικές γραμμές στην ΕΕ και ο ΕΜ εξέφρασε τη διαφωνία του με την θέση της Γερμανίδας υπουργού Άμυνας Αννεγκρέτ Κραμπ-Κάρρενμπαουερ, η οποία χαρακτήρισε την ευρωπαϊκή στρατηγική αυτονομία ως αυταπάτη και επανεπιβεβαίωσε την κεντρικότητα της διατλαντικής συνεργασίας για την ευρωπαϊκή άμυνα.

«I strongly disagree with the tribune published in Politico signed by the German Minister of Defense. I think this is a misnomer of history. Fortunately, the Chancellor is not on this line if I understood it correctly.»

Πέρα από την άμυνα, η ευρωπαϊκή στρατηγική αυτονομία και στο τεχνολογικό επίπεδο. Η ανάπτυξη του 5G και η ευρωπαϊκή δυνατότητα αποθήκευσης data, έχουν ειδική βαρύτητα.

«When we talk about technologies, Europe needs to build its own solutions so as not to depend on American-Chinese technology. If we are dependent on it, for example in telecommunications, we cannot guarantee European citizens the secrecy of information and the security of their private data, because we do not have this technology. As a political power, Europe must be able to provide solutions in terms of the cloud, otherwise your data will be stored in a space that is not under its right – which is the current situation. On technology, things have changed since we launched the idea of European 5G, and Germany is joining us on this subject.»

Τέλος, η στρατηγική αυτονομία θα πρέπει να επιβεβαιώνεται και σε νομικό επίπεδο.

«The same goes for the extraterritoriality of the dollar, which is a fact and is not new. Less than ten years ago, several French companies were penalized by several billion euros because they had operated in countries which were the subject of a ban under American law. This means concretely that our companies can be condemned by foreign powers when they have an activity in a third country: it is a deprivation of sovereignty, of the possibility of deciding for ourselves, it is an immense weakening.»

Μία νέα σχέση Ευρώπης-Αφρικής
Για τον ΕΜ, η Ευρώπη και η Αφρική μοιράζονται ένα κοινό πεπρωμένο και δοκιμάζονται από τις ίδιες κρίσεις, μεταξύ των οποίων, η ισλαμική τρομοκρατία είναι από τις πιο σημαντικές.

«[The crisis of terrorism] has returned in recent months with a lot of force in Europe but also in Africa. I am thinking in particular of this terrorism which is called Islamist, but which is carried out in the name of an ideology which distorts a religion.

To fight terrorism, we are all struck here too: we must not forget that more than 80% of the victims of this Islamist terrorism come from the Muslim world, as we have seen in Mozambique in recent days.»

Με βάση τις κοινές προοπτικές, ο ΕΜ προτείνει μία συνεργασία μεταξύ Ευρώπης και Αφρικής, βασισμένης σε πραγματική ισότητα.

«This overhaul must be based on a Europe that is much more geopolitically united and which engages Africa as a partner with it, in a completely equal way. We did it on the fight against desertification in Nairobi. We also did it when we had the presidency of the G7: we set up coalitions of actors to reduce international maritime transport, to reduce HFCs, and by building a G7 with African countries.»

Το μελλοντικό εμβόλιο για τον κορωνοϊό θα είναι το σύμβολο αυτής της νέας συνεργασίας μεταξύ Ευρώπης και Αφρικής.

«When the virus arrived, we had only one fear: if the virus arrives in Africa and other poor countries, how will they do it? […] Immediately, we launched an African Union Office, online, with several leaders, before bringing this voice to Europe and the G20. And we have structured this Act-A initiative with the African Union, the European Union, the other powers of the G20, the WHO, to make it possible to finance the improvement of primary care systems, and especially the guarantee that the vaccine would be a global public good and that we would put ourselves in a position to produce enough to supply them to the poorest countries.»

Με τη μετατροπή της Ευρώπης σε «πρώτη εκπαιδευτική, υγειονομική, ψηφιακή και πράσινη δύναμη» και την υιοθέτηση ενός νέου συστήματος αξιών, ο ευρωαφρικανικός άξονας αποτελεί το επόμενο βήμα.

«And the third major European project is for me the conversion of views with Africa and the reinvention of the Afro-European axis. […] Europe will not succeed if Africa does not succeed. This is certain. We see it when we cannot create security, peace or prosperity through migration. We see it because Africa is in our societies. We have a part of Africa in all our societies, which also lives in consonance. And when I say Africa I mean Africa and the Mediterranean lato sensu.»

Για τον ΕΜ, πρέπει να εγκαταλειφθεί από την Ευρώπη το πρίσμα της μετανάστευσης, μέσα από το οποίο αντιμετωπίζει την Αφρική. Αυτό όμως σημαίνει ότι πρέπει ως προϋπόθεση να υπάρξει μεταρρύθμιση της στρατηγικής για τη μετανάστευση για να αποφευχθεί αυτό που ο ΕΜ ονομάζει, μαζική εκτροπή του δικαιώματος για το άσυλο.

«And, basically, what could complicate Europe’s relationship with Africa today? It is the migratory fact, which is it. This is because we only look at Africa through this medium. I think this is a mistake. It must be resolved, on certain subjects. Today we are witnessing a massive abuse of the right to asylum. This is what upsets everything. […] There is tension on this subject. It must be resolved in a dialogue with Africa, which we initiated in 2017-2018. On which we must start with a lot of commitment.»

Η αλλαγή της οπτικής για την Αφρική, πρέπει να θεωρηθεί ως μία πραγματική ιστορική ρήξη των σχέσεων Ευρώπης-Αφρικής που υπήρξε στο παρελθόν.

«I say this because I don’t believe that we will move forward or solve our problems by being imprisoned by our history. I myself launched important memorial and political works on Algeria in particular, but I see in our history as a return of resentment and repressed where all the subjects from elsewhere come to mingle: post-decolonization, religious subjects, economic and social subjects, which create a form of incommunicability between Europe and Africa. I think we have to untie these threads but above all we have to embrace Africa with much more force in the capacity that we give it to develop itself, by helping it.»

Τέταρτον, ο οικολογικός άξονας
Για τον ΕΜ, η οικολογική στροφή είναι σημαντική, αλλά δεν πρέπει να αμφισβητεί ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα.

«I think that the fight against climate change and for biodiversity is central to the political choices we have to make. This does not mean that it takes precedence irrevocably. As I have already said, I am not for a natural right which is superior to human rights. But I think that we can no longer think about human rights without thinking about these interactions, these consequences. […] We are unlucky, we are the ones who have to deal with reality in all these tensions. It is full of tension, this subject.»

Ο ΕΜ θεωρεί ότι η οικολογική μετάβαση δεν θα γίνει άμεσα και δεν θα είναι εύκολο να αμφισβητηθούν τρόποι ζωής στις δυτικές κοινωνίες. Προς το παρόν, η οικολογική μετάβαση είναι σχετικά ακατανόητη για πολλούς πολίτες, ιδίως στις μεσαίες τάξεις.

«[…] If I take a French family, who have done everything that has been asked of them for thirty years. We told her: “we have to find a job” – she found a job. She was told, “you have to buy a pavilion” – but a pavilion is too expensive in the big city, so she bought it 40, 50, 60 kilometers from the big city. She was told, “the model of success is to have each one’s own car” – she bought two cars. […]

This family, you tell them: “you are big polluters, you have a badly insulated house, you have a car and you travel 80, 100, and 150 kilometers. The new world does not like you. “People are going crazy! […] The middle classes of European and Western democracies have experienced change as a synonym of sacrifice.»

Ο ΕΜ θεωρεί ότι ο μετασχηματισμός της κινητικότητας, μέσα από το σύμβολο του αυτοκινήτου, αποτελεί το κλειδί για την οικολογική μετάβαση. Στην πραγματικότητα όμως, πρόκειται για ένα ανθρωπολογικό θέμα το οποίο πρέπει να αντιμετωπιστεί σε αυτό το επίπεδο.

«Then there is a whole work, I would say political, in the noble sense of the term, anthropological, which is to engage our societies in this change, to make them actors. And then, there is the alignment of our entire agenda in relation to that. […] To make this transition a success, I also want us to pass rules at the level of Europe and financial markets – as we have been able to do on prudential or strict finance matters – which penalize investment in the fossil fuel and encourage investment in green.»

Πέμπτο, ο άξονας του εμβολίου
Ο ΕΜ περιγράφει τη μέθοδο που χρησιμοποιήθηκε για να συγκεντρωθούν όλοι οι εμπλεκόμενοι στην έρευνα του εμβολίου, η οποία περιλαμβάνει την ενεργοποίηση κρατικών, διεθνών και μη κρατικών φορέων.

«On the subject of health, in fact, between Act-A and the COVAX strategy that we launched, we put around the table international organizations, such as the WHO, States, regional powers, such as The European Union and the African Union, we put sectoral funds, like Unitaid, like Gavi, we put in private foundations, like the Gates foundation for example, and industrial actors and public laboratories who work on the projects. It’s completely hybrid, but with a governance that has been entrusted to the WHO so that there are no conflicts of interest. Because the WHO is the guarantor of a system where we do not allow the private sector to decide the rules for everyone.»

Ο ΕΜ επισημαίνει ακόμα, τη χρησιμοποίηση του εμβολίου για επίτευξη στόχων ηγεμονίας. Αντιθέτως, θεωρεί το εμβόλιο ως παγκόσμιο κοινό αγαθό και το κράτος ως εγγυητή του κοινού συμφέροντος στο θέμα αυτό.

«There will be a diplomacy of the vaccine, that is to say that everyone will want to wave their flag by saying” I found it “. So there will be a precipitation effect under the pressure of public opinion to very quickly say “we have the right vaccine”. We will have to be very vigilant on this. And be careful: have all the scientific rules and due diligence been done? It is our state scientists who can say it and those of the WHO, because they have no conflict of interest. Let us never forget what we have built: the State is the guarantor of the general interest. It cannot be delegated. And there the States have a role to play.»

Ο ΕΜ εμφανίζεται αισιόδοξος για τη μέθοδο που έχει εφαρμοστεί ως σήμερα, παρά το γεγονός ότι υπάρχουν κίνδυνοι, οι μεγάλοι διεθνείς παίκτες να ανατρέψουν αυτή την κατάσταση.

«But behind that, the negotiations that are in the process of being carried out with States and companies are a very good test of this new multilateralism. It is the idea of the global public good, in any case, to have global access to the vaccine. […] I don’t know if we’re going to win this battle. Because very clearly I am not sure that all countries want to get involved in this. We will see if China is ready, if it is China to discover the vaccine, if Russia is ready, if the United States is ready with the new administration – it was not sure with the previous one, well the current one – and we will see what companies are doing. But whatever happens, what we have done creates a common framework with all the important actors around the table: a trusted third party which is the WHO, cooperation mechanisms, peer pressure. And so we have the maximum chance that when there is something, if one of these actors behaves badly, he will have a lot to lose by behaving badly. But this is the new multilateralism.»

ΠΑΡΑΠΟΜΠΕΣ
[1] https://geopolitique.eu/en/macron-grand-continent/